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Abstract
We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model
counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of
causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions
and resolves major difficulties in the traditional account.
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1 Introduction
What does it mean that an event C actually caused event E? The problem of defining “ac-
tual cause” goes beyond mere philosophical speculation. As Good [1993] and Michie [1999]
argue persuasively, in many legal settings, what needs to be established (for determining re-
sponsibility) is exactly such “cause in fact”. A typical example [Wright 1988] considers two
fires advancing toward a house. If fire A burned the house before fire B, we (and many juries
nationwide) would consider fire A “the actual cause” for the damage, even supposing that the
house would definitely have been burned down by fire B, if it were not for A. Actual causation
is also important in artificial intelligence applications. Whenever we undertake to explain a
set of events that unfold in a specific scenario, the explanation produced must acknowledge
the actual cause of those events. The automatic generation of adequate explanations, a task
essential in planning, diagnosis, and natural language processing, therefore requires a formal
analysis of the concept of actual cause.
The philosophy literature has been struggling with this problem of defining causality since
at least the days of Hume [1739], who was the first to identify causation with counterfactual
dependence. To quote Hume [1748, Section VIII]:
We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, ..., where, if the first
object had not been, the second never had existed.
Among modern philosophers, the counterfactual interpretation of causality continues to re-
ceive most attention, primarily due to the work of David Lewis [1973]. Lewis has given
counterfactual dependence formal underpinning in possible-world semantics and has equated
actual causation with the transitive closure of counterfactual dependencies. C is classified
as a cause of E if C is linked to E by a chain of events each directly depending on its
predecessor. However, Lewis’s dependence theory has encountered many difficulties. (See
[Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004; Hall and Paul 2003; Pearl 2000; Sosa and Tooley 1993] for some
recent discussion.) The problem is that effects may not always counterfactually depend on their
causes, either directly or indirectly, as the two-fire example illustrates. In addition, causation
is not always transitive, as implied Lewis’s chain-dependence account (see Example 4.3).
Here we give a definition of actual causality cast in the language of structural equations.
The basic idea is to extend the basic notion of counterfactual dependency to allow “contingent
dependency”. In other words, while effects may not always counterfactually depend on their
causes in the actual situation, they do depend on them under certain contingencies. In the
case of the two fires, for example, the house burning down does depend on fire A under the
contingency that firefighters reach the house any time between the actual arrival of fire A and
that of fire B. Under that contingency, if fire A had not been started, the house would not have
burned down. The house burning down also depends on fireA under the contingency that fireB
was not started. But this leads to an obvious concern: the house burning down also depends on
fire B under the contingency that fire A was not started. We do not want to consider this latter
contingency. Roughly speaking, we want to allow only contingencies that do not interfere with
active causal processes. Our formal definition of actual causality tries to make this precise.
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In Part II of the paper [Halpern and Pearl 2005], we give a definition of (causal) explana-
tion using the definition of causality. An explanation adds information to an agent’s knowledge;
very roughly, an explanation of ϕ is a minimal elaboration of events that suffice to cause ϕ even
in the face of uncertainty about the actual situation.
The use of structural equations as a model for causal relationships is standard in the social
sciences, and seems to go back to the work of Sewall Wright in the 1920s (see [Goldberger 1972]
for a discussion); the particular framework that we use here is due to Pearl [1995], and is fur-
ther developed in [Galles and Pearl 1997; Halpern 2000; Pearl 2000]. While it is hard to argue
that our definition (or any other definition, for that matter) is the “right” definition, we show
that it deals well with the difficulties that have plagued other approaches in the past, especially
those exemplified by the rather extensive compendium of Hall and Paul [2003].
According to our definition, the truth of every claim must be evaluated relative to a par-
ticular model of the world; that is, our definition allows us to claim only that C causes E in
a (particular context in a) particular structural model. It is possible to construct two closely
related structural models such that C causes E in one and C does not cause E in the other.
Among other things, the modeler must decide which variables (events) to reason about and
which to leave in the background. We view this as a feature of our model, not a bug. It moves
the question of actual causality to the right arena—debating which of two (or more) models of
the world is a better representation of those aspects of the world that one wishes to capture and
reason about. This, indeed, is the type of debate that goes on in informal (and legal) arguments
all the time.
There has been extensive discussion about causality in the philosophy literature. To keep
this paper to manageable length, we spend only minimal time describing other approaches and
comparing ours with them. We refer the reader to [Hall and Paul 2003; Pearl 2000; Sosa and Tooley 1993;
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 1993] for details and criticism of the probabilistic and logical
approaches to causality in the philosophy literature. (We do try to point out where our defini-
tion does better than perhaps the best-known approach, due to Lewis [1973, 2000], as well as
some other recent approaches [Hall 2000; Paul 1998; Yablo 2002], in the course of discussing
the examples.)
There has also been work in the AI literature on causality. Perhaps the closest to this are
papers by Pearl and his colleagues that use the structural-model approach. The definition of
causality in this paper was inspired by an earlier paper of Pearl’s [1998] that defined actual
causality in terms of a construction called a causal beam. The definition was later modified
somewhat (see [Pearl 2000, Chapter 10]). The modifications were in fact largely due to the
considerations addressed in this paper. The definition given here is more transparent and han-
dles a number of cases better (see Example A.3 in the appendix).
Tian and Pearl [2000] give results on estimating (from empirical data) the probability that
C is a necessary cause of E—that is, the probability that E would not have occurred if C had
not occurred. Necessary causality is related to but different from actual causality, as the defi-
nitions should make clear. Other work (for example, [Heckerman and Shachter 1995]) focuses
on when a random variable X is the cause of a random variable Y ; by way of contrast, we
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focus on when an event such as X = x causes an event such as Y = y. Considering when
a random variable is the cause of another is perhaps more appropriate as a prospective notion
of causality: could X potentially be a cause of changes in Y . Our notion is more appropriate
for a retrospective notion of causality: given all the information relevant to a given scenario,
was X = x the actual cause of Y = y in that scenario? Many of the subtleties that arise when
dealing with events simply disappear if we look at causality at the level of random variables.
Finally, there is also a great deal of work in AI on formal action theory (see, for example,
[Lin 1995; Sandewall 1994; Reiter 2001]), which is concerned with the proper way of incor-
porating causal relationships into a knowledge base so as to guide actions. The focus of our
work is quite different; we are concerned with extracting the actual causality relation from such
a knowledge base, coupled with a specific scenario.
The best ways to judge the adequacy of an approach are the intuitive appeal of the defini-
tions and how well it deals with examples; we believe that this paper shows that our approach
fares well on both counts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review structural
models. In Section 3 we give a preliminary definition of actual causality and show in Section 4
how it deals with some examples of causality that have been problematic for other accounts.
We refine the definition slightly in Section 5, and show how the refinement handles further
examples. We conclude in Section 6 with some discussion.
2 Causal Models: A Review
In this section we review the basic definitions of causal models, as defined in terms of structural
equations, and the syntax and semantics of a language for reasoning about causality. We also
briefly compare our approach with the more standard approaches to modeling causality used
in the literature.
Causal Models: The description of causal models given here is taken from [Halpern 2000];
the reader is referred to [Galles and Pearl 1997; Halpern 2000; Pearl 2000] for more details,
motivation, and intuition.
The basic picture here is that we are interested in the values of random variables. If X is
a random variable, a typical event has the form X = x. (In terms of possible worlds, this just
represents the set of possible worlds where X takes on value x, although the model does not
describe the set of possible worlds.) Some random variables may have a causal influence on
others. This influence is modeled by a set of structural equations. Each equation represents
a distinct mechanism (or law) in the world, one that may be modified (by external actions)
without altering the others. In practice, it seems useful to split the random variables into two
sets, the exogenous variables, whose values are determined by factors outside the model, and
the endogenous variables, whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous variables.
It is these endogenous variables whose values are described by the structural equations.
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Formally, a signature S is a tuple (U ,V,R), where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is
a set of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty
set R(Y ) of possible values for Y (that is, the set of values over which Y ranges). In most
of this paper (except the appendix) we assume that V is finite. A causal model (or structural
model) over signature S is a tuple M = (S,F), where F associates with each variable X ∈ V
a function denoted FX such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X). FX
determines the value of X given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V . For example,
if FX(Y, Z, U) = Y + U (which we usually write as X = Y + U), then if Y = 3 and
U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set. These equations can be thought of as
representing processes (or mechanisms) by which values are assigned to variables. Hence, like
physical laws, they support a counterfactual interpretation. For example, the equation above
claims that, in the context U = u, if Y were 4, then X would be u + 4 (which we write as
(M,u) |= [Y ← 4](X = u + 4)), regardless of what values X , Y , and Z actually take in the
real world.
The function F defines a set of (modifiable) structural equations, relating the values of
the variables. Because FX is a function, there is a unique value of X once we have set all
the other variables. Notice that we have such functions only for the endogenous variables.
The exogenous variables are taken as given; it is their effect on the endogenous variables (and
the effect of the endogenous variables on each other) that we are modeling with the structural
equations.
The counterfactual interpretation and the causal asymmetry associated with the structural
equations are best seen when we consider external interventions (or spontaneous changes),
under which some equations in F are modified. An equation such as x = FX(~u, y) should
be thought of as saying that in a context where the exogenous variables have values ~u, if Y
were set to y by some means (not specified in the model), then X would take on the value x, as
dictated by FX . The same does not hold when we intervene directly onX; such an intervention
amounts to assigning a value to X by external means, thus overruling the assignment specified
by FX . In this case, Y is no longer committed to tracking X according to FX . Variables on the
left-hand side of equations are treated differently from ones on the right-hand side.
For those more comfortable with thinking of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds,
this modification of equations may be given a simple “closest world” interpretation: the so-
lution of the equations obtained by replacing the equation for Y with the equation Y = y,
while leaving all other equations unaltered, gives the closest “world” to the actual world where
Y = y. In this possible-world interpretation, the asymmetry embodied in the model says that
if X = x in the closest world to w where Y = y, it does not follow that Y = y in the closest
worlds to w where X = x. In terms of structural equations, this just says that if X = x is the
solution for X under the intervention Y = y, it does not follow that Y = y is the solution for Y
under the intervention X = x. Each of two interventions modifies the system of equations in
a distinct way; the former modifies the equation in which Y stands on the left, while the latter
modifies the equation in which X stands on the left.
In summary, the equal sign in a structural equation differs from algebraic equality; in addi-
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tion to describing an equality relationship between variables, it acts as an assignment statement
in programming languages, since it specifies the way variables’ values are determined. This
should become clearer in our examples.
Example 2.1: Suppose that we want to reason about a forest fire that could be caused by
either lightning or a match lit by an arsonist. Then the causal model would have the following
endogenous variables (and perhaps others):
• F for fire (F = 1 if there is one, F = 0 otherwise);
• L for lightning (L = 1 if lightning occurred, L = 0 otherwise);
• ML for match lit (ML = 1 if the match was lit, ML = 0 otherwise).
The set U of exogenous variables includes conditions that suffice to render all relationships
deterministic (such as whether the wood is dry, whether there is enough oxygen in the air for
the match to light, etc.). Suppose that ~u is a setting of the exogenous variables that makes a
forest fire possible (i.e., the wood is sufficiently dry, there is oxygen in the air, and so on).
Then, for example, FF (~u, L,ML) is such that F = 1 if either L = 1 or ML = 1. Note that
although the value of F depends on the values of L and ML, the value of L does not depend on
the values of F and ML.
As we said, a causal model has the resources to determine counterfactual effects. Given a
causal model M = (S,F), a (possibly empty) vector ~X of variables in V , and vectors ~x and ~u
of values for the variables in ~X and U , respectively, we can define a new causal model denoted
M ~X←~x over the signature S ~X = (U ,V − ~X,R|V− ~X).1 M ~X←~x is called a submodel of M by
Pearl [2000]. Intuitively, this is the causal model that results when the variables in ~X are set to
~x by by some external action that affects only the variables in ~X; we do not model the action
or its causes explicitly. Formally, M ~X←~x = (S ~X ,F
~X←~x), where F ~X←~xY is obtained from FY
by setting the values of the variables in ~X to ~x. For example, if M is the structural model
describing Example 2.1, then the model ML←0 has the equation F = ML. The equation for F
in ML←0 no longer involves L; rather, it is determined by setting L to 0 in the equation for F
in M . Moreover, there is no equation for L in ML←0.
It may seem strange that we are trying to understand causality using causal models, which
clearly already encode causal relationships. Our reasoning is not circular. Our aim is not
to reduce causation to noncausal concepts, but to interpret questions about causes of specific
events in fully specified scenarios in terms of generic causal knowledge such as what we obtain
from the equations of physics. The causal models encode background knowledge about the
tendency of certain event types to cause other event types (such as the fact that lightning can
cause forest fires). We use the models to determine the causes of single (or token) events, such
1We are implicitly identifying the vector ~X with the subset of V consisting of the variables in ~X . R|
V− ~X
is
the restriction of R to the variables in V − ~X .
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as whether it was arson that caused the fire of June 10, 2000, given what is known or assumed
about that particular fire.
Notice that, in general, there may not be a unique vector of values that simultaneously
satisfies the equations in M ~X←~x; indeed, there may not be a solution at all. For simplicity in
this paper, we restrict attention to what are called recursive (or acyclic) equations. This is the
special case where there is some total ordering ≺ of the variables in V such that if X ≺ Y ,
then FX is independent of the value of Y ; that is, FX(. . . , y, . . .) = FX(. . . , y′, . . .) for all
y, y′ ∈ R(Y ). Intuitively, if a theory is recursive, there is no feedback. If X ≺ Y , then the
value of X may effect the value of Y , but the value of Y has no effect on the value of X . We do
not lose much generality by restricting to recursive models (that is, ones whose equations are
recursive). As suggested in the latter half of Example 4.2, it is always possible to timestamp
events to impose an ordering on variables and thus construct a recursive model corresponding
to a story. In any case, in the appendix, we sketch the necessary modifications of our definitions
to deal with nonrecursive models.
It should be clear that if M is a recursive causal model, then there is always a unique
solution to the equations in M ~X←~x, given a setting ~u for the variables in U (we call such a
setting ~u a context). We simply solve for the variables in the order given by ≺.
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model M using a causal network. This
is a graph with nodes corresponding to the random variables in V and an edge from a node
labeled X to one labeled Y if FY depends on the value of X . This graph is a dag—a directed,
acyclic graph (that is, a graph with no cycle of directed edges). The acyclicity follows from the
assumption that the equations are recursive. Intuitively, variables can have a causal effect only
on their descendants in the causal network; if Y is not a descendant of X , then a change in the
value of X has no affect on the value of Y . For example, the causal network for Example 2.1
has the following form:
MLL
F
U
Figure 1: A simple causal network.
We remark that we occasionally omit the exogenous variables ~U from the causal network.
These causal networks, which are similar in spirit to the Bayesian networks used to repre-
sent and reason about dependences in probability distributions [Pearl 1988], will play a signifi-
cant role in our definitions. They are quite similar in spirit to Lewis’s [1973] neuron diagrams,
but there are significant differences as well. Roughly speaking, neuron diagrams display ex-
plicitly the functional relationships (among variables in V) for each specific context ~u. The
class of functions represented by neuron diagrams is limited to those described by “stimula-
tory” and “inhibitory” binary inputs. Causal networks represent arbitrary functional relation-
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ships, although the exact nature of the functions is specified in the structural equations and
is not encoded in the diagram. The structural equations carry all the information we need to
do causal reasoning, including all the information about belief, causation, intervention, and
counterfactual behavior.
As we shall see, there are many nontrivial decisions to be made when choosing the struc-
tural model. One significant decision is the set of variables used. As we shall see, the events
that can be causes and those that can be caused are expressed in terms of these variables, as are
all the intermediate events. By way of contrast, in the philosophy literature, these events can
be created on the fly, as it were. We return to this point in our examples.
Once the set of variables is chosen, it must be decided which are exogenous and which
are endogenous. The exogenous variables to some extent encode the background situation,
which we wish to take for granted. Other implicit background assumptions are encoded in
the structural equations themselves. Suppose that we are trying to decide whether a lightning
bolt or a match was the cause of the forest fire, and we want to take for granted that there is
sufficient oxygen in the air and the wood is dry. We could model the dryness of the wood by an
exogenous variable D with values 0 (the wood is wet) and 1 (the wood is dry).2 By making D
exogenous, its value is assumed to be given and out of the control of the modeler. We could also
take the amount of oxygen as an exogenous variable (for example, there could be a variable
O with two values—0, for insufficient oxygen, and 1, for sufficient oxygen); alternatively, we
could choose not to model oxygen explicitly at all. For example, suppose we have, as before,
a random variable ML for match lit, and another variable WB for wood burning, with values 0
(it’s not) and 1 (it is). The structural equation FWB would describe the dependence of WB on
D and ML. By setting FWB(1, 1) = 1, we are saying that the wood will burn if the match is
lit and the wood is dry. Thus, the equation is implicitly modeling our assumption that there is
sufficient oxygen for the wood to burn.
We remark that, according to the definition in Section 3, only endogenous variables can be
causes or be caused. Thus, if no variables encode the presence of oxygen, or if it is encoded
only in an exogenous variable, then oxygen cannot be a cause of the wood burning. If we were
to explicitly model the amount of oxygen in the air (which certainly might be relevant if we
were analyzing fires on Mount Everest), then FWB would also take values ofO as an argument,
and the presence of sufficient oxygen might well be a cause of the wood burning.3
Besides encoding some of our implicit assumptions, the structural equations can be viewed
as encoding the causal mechanisms at work. Changing the underlying causal mechanism can
affect what counts as a cause. Section 4 provides several examples of the importance of the
choice of random variables and the choice of causal mechanism. It is not always straightfor-
ward to decide what the “right” causal model is in a given situation, nor is it always obvious
which of two causal models is “better” in some sense. These may be difficult decisions and
2Of course, in practice, we may want to allow D to have more values, indicating the degree of dryness of the
wood, but that level of complexity is unnecessary for the points we are trying to make here.
3If there are other variables in the model, these would be arguments to FWB as well; we have ignored other
variables here just to make our point.
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often lie at the heart of determining actual causality in the real world. Nevertheless, we believe
that the tools we provide here should help in making principled decisions about those choices.
Syntax and Semantics: To make the definition of actual causality precise, it is helpful to
have a logic with a formal syntax. Given a signature S = (U ,V,R), a formula of the form
X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X), is called a primitive event. A basic causal formula (over
S) is one of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events,
• Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V , and
• yi ∈ R(Yi).
Such a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ.
Intuitively, [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ holds in the counterfactual world that would
arise if Yi were set to yi, i = 1, . . . , k. A causal formula is a Boolean combination of basic
causal formulas.4
A causal formula ψ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. We write (M,~u) |=
ψ if ψ is true in causal model M given context ~u.5 (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) if the
variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with recursive models) solution
to the equations in M~Y←~y in context ~u (that is, the unique vector of values for the exogenous
variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations F ~Y←~yZ , Z ∈ V − ~Y , with the variables in U
set to ~u). (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y]ϕ for an arbitrary Boolean combination ϕ of formulas of the form
~X = ~x is defined similarly. We extend the definition to arbitrary causal formulas, i.e., Boolean
combinations of basic causal formulas, in the obvious way.
Note that the structural equations are deterministic. We can make sense out of probabilistic
counterfactual statements, even conditional ones (the probability that X would be 3 if Y1 were
2, given that Y is in fact 1) in this framework (see [Balke and Pearl 1994]), by putting a proba-
bility on the set of possible contexts. This will not be necessary for our discussion of causality,
although it will play a more significant role in the discussion of explanation.
3 The Definition of Cause
With all this notation in hand, we can now give a preliminary version of the definition of actual
cause (“cause” for short). We want to make sense out of statements of the form “event A is
4If we write → for conditional implication, then a formula such as [Y ← y]ϕ can be written as Y = y → ϕ:
if Y were y, then ϕ would hold. We use the present notation to emphasize the fact that, although we are viewing
Y ← y as a modal operator, we are not giving semantics using the standard possible worlds approach.
5We remark that in [Galles and Pearl 1997; Halpern 2000], the context ~u does not appear on the left-hand
side of |=; rather, it is incorporated in the formula ψ on the right-hand side (so that a basic formula becomes
X(~u) = x). Additionally, Pearl [2000] abbreviated (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) as Xy(u) = x. The presentation
here makes certain things more explicit, although they are technically equivalent.
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an actual cause of event ϕ (in context ~u)”.6 As we said earlier, the context is the background
information. While this has been left implicit in some treatments of causality, we find it useful
to make it explicit. The picture here is that the context (and the structural equations) are given.
Intuitively, they encode the background knowledge. All the relevant events are known. The
only question is picking out which of them are the causes of ϕ or, alternatively, testing whether
a given set of events can be considered the cause of ϕ.7
The types of events that we allow as actual causes are ones of the formX1 = x1∧. . .∧Xk =
xk—that is, conjunctions of primitive events; we typically abbreviate this as ~X = ~x. The
events that can be caused are arbitrary Boolean combinations of primitive events. We might
consider generalizing further to allow disjunctive causes. We do not believe that we lose much
by disallowing disjunctive causes here. Since for causality we are assuming that the structural
model and all the relevant facts are known, the only reasonable definition of “A or B causes
ϕ” seems to be that “either A causes ϕ or B causes ϕ”. There are no truly disjunctive causes
once all the relevant facts are known.8
Definition 3.1: (Actual cause; preliminary version) ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if
the following three conditions hold.
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ. (That is, both ~X = ~x and ϕ are true in the actual world.)
AC2. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the
variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for all Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the
following conditions hold:
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ. In words, changing ( ~X, ~W ) from (~x, ~w) to
(~x′, ~w′) changes ϕ from true to false.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W and all subsets
~Z ′ of ~Z. In words, setting any subset of variables in ~W to their values in ~w′ should
have no effect on ϕ, as long as ~X is kept at its current value ~x, even if all the
variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the context ~u.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2. Minimality ensures
that only those elements of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential for changing ϕ in
AC2(a) are considered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned.
6Note that we are using the word “event” here in the standard sense of “set of possible worlds” (as opposed to
“transition between states of affairs”); essentially we are identifying events with propositions.
7We use both past tense and present tense in our examples (“was the cause” versus “is the cause”), with the
usage depending on whether the scenario implied by the context ~u is perceived to have taken place in the past or
to persist through the present.
8Having said that, see the end of Example 3.2 for further discussion of this issue. Disjunctive explanations
seem more interesting, although we cannot handle them well in our framework; these are discussed in Part II.
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Although we have labeled this definition “preliminary”, it is actually very close to the
final definition. We discuss the final definition in Section 5, after we have considered a few
examples.
The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally, the variables in ~Z should be thought of
as describing the “active causal process” from ~X to ϕ (also called “intrinsic process” by Lewis
[1986, Appendix D]).9 These are the variables that mediate between ~X and ϕ. Indeed, we can
define an active causal process from ~X = ~x to ϕ as a minimal set ~Z that satisfies AC2. We
would expect that the variables in an active causal process are all on a path from a variable in ~X
to a variable in ϕ. This is indeed the case. Moreover, it can easily be shown that the variables in
an active causal process all change their values when ( ~X, ~W ) is set to (~x′, ~w′) as in AC2. Any
variable that does not change in this transition can be moved to W , while retaining its value in
w′—the remaining variables in ~Z will still satisfy AC2. (See the appendix for a formal proof.)
AC2(a) says that there exists a setting ~x′ of ~X that changes ϕ to ¬ϕ, as long as the variables not
involved in the causal process ( ~W ) take on value ~w′. AC2(a) is reminiscent of the traditional
counterfactual criterion of Lewis [1973], according to which ϕ would be false if it were not
for ~X being ~x. However, AC2(a) is more permissive than the traditional criterion; it allows the
dependence of ϕ on ~X to be tested under special circumstances in which the variables ~W are
held constant at some setting ~w′. This modification of the traditional criterion was proposed
by Pearl [1998, 2000] and was named structural contingency—an alteration of the model M
that involves the breakdown of some mechanisms (possibly emerging from external action)
but no change in the context ~u. The need to invoke such contingencies will be made clear in
Example 3.2, and is further supported by the examples of Hitchcock [2001].
AC2(b), which has no obvious analogue in the literature, is an attempt to counteract the
“permissiveness” of AC2(a) with regard to structural contingencies. Essentially, it ensures that
~X alone suffices to bring about the change from ϕ to ¬ϕ; setting ~W to ~w′ merely eliminates
spurious side effects that tend to mask the action of ~X . It captures the fact that setting ~W
to ~w′ does not affect the causal process by requiring that changing the values of any subset
of the variables in ~W from ~w to ~w′ has no effect on the value of ϕ.10 Moreover, although
the values in the variables ~Z involved in the causal process may be perturbed by the change,
the perturbation has no impact on the value of ϕ. The upshot of this requirement is that we
are not at liberty to conduct the counterfactual test of AC2(a) under an arbitrary alteration
of the model. The alteration considered must not affect the causal process. Clearly, if the
contingencies considered are limited to “freezing” variables at their actual value (a restriction
used by Hitchcock [2001]), so that (M,~u) |= ~W = ~w′, then AC2(b) is satisfied automatically.
However, as the examples below show, genuine causation may sometimes be revealed only
through a broader class of counterfactual tests in which variables in ~W are set to values that
differ from their actual values.
9Recently, Lewis [2000] has abandoned attempts to define “intrinsic process” formally. Pearl’s “causal beam”
[Pearl 2000, p. 318] is a special kind of active causal process, in which AC2(b) is expected to hold (with ~Z = ~z∗)
for all settings ~w′′ of ~W , not necessarily the setting ~w′ used in AC2(a).
10This version of AC2(b) differs slightly from that in an earlier version of this paper [Halpern and Pearl 2001].
See Appendix A.2 for more discussion of this issue.
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Pearl [2000] defines a notion of contributory cause in addition to actual cause. Roughly
speaking, if AC2(a) holds only with ~W = ~w′ 6= ~w, then ~X = ~x is a contributory cause of ϕ;
actual causality holds only if ~W = ~w. Interestingly, in all our examples in Section 4, changing
~W from ~w to ~w′ has no impact on the value of the variables in ~Z. That is, (M,~u) |= [ ~W ←
~w′](Z = z∗) for all Z ∈ ~Z. Thus, to check AC2(b) in these examples, it suffices to show that
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′]ϕ. We provide an example in the appendix to show that there are
cases where the variables in ~Z can change value, so the full strength of AC2(b) is necessary.
We remark that, like the definition here, the causal beam definition [Pearl 2000] tests for
the existence of counterfactual dependency in an auxiliary model of the world, modified by
a select set of structural contingencies. However, whereas the contingencies selected by the
beam criterion depend only on the relationship between a variable and its parents in the causal
diagram, the current definition selects the modifying contingencies based on the specific cause
and effect pair being tested. This refinement permits our definition to avoid certain pitfalls
(see Example A.3) that are associated with graphical criteria for actual causation. In addition,
the causal beam definition essentially adds another clause to AC2, placing even more stringent
requirements on causality. Specifically, it requires
AC2(c). (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′′]ϕ for all settings ~w′′ of ~W .
AC2(c) says that setting ~X to ~x is enough to force ϕ to hold, independent of the setting of ~W .11
We say that ~X = ~x strongly causes ϕ if AC2(c) holds in addition to all the other conditions.
As we shall see, in many of our examples, causality and strong causality coincide. In the cases
where they do not coincide, our intuitions suggest that strong causality is too strong a notion.
AC3 is a minimality condition. Heckerman and Shachter [1995] have a similar minimality
requirement; Lewis [2000] mentions the need for minimality as well. Interestingly, in all the
examples we have considered, AC3 forces the cause to be a single conjunct of the form X = x.
Although it is far from obvious, Eiter and Lukasiewicz [2002] and, independently, Hopkins
[2001], have shown that this is in fact a consequence of our definition. However, it depends
crucially on our assumption that the set V of endogenous variables is finite; see the appendix
for further discussion of this issue. As we shall see, it also depends on the fact that we are
using causality rather than strong causality.
How reasonable are these requirements? One issue that some might find inappropriate is
that we allow X = x to be a cause of itself. While we do not find such trivial causality terribly
bothersome, it can be avoided by requiring that ~X = ~x ∧ ¬ϕ be consistent for ~X = ~x to be a
cause of ϕ. More significantly, is it appropriate to invoke structural changes in the definition
of actual causation? The following example may help illustrate why we believe it is.
Example 3.2: Suppose that two arsonists drop lit matches in different parts of a dry forest, and
both cause trees to start burning. Consider two scenarios. In the first, called the disjunctive
scenario, either match by itself suffices to burn down the whole forest. That is, even if only
11Pearl [2000] calls this invariance sustenance.
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one match were lit, the forest would burn down. In the second scenario, called the conjunctive
scenario, both matches are necessary to burn down the forest; if only one match were lit, the
fire would die down before the forest was consumed. We can describe the essential structure
of these two scenarios using a causal model with four variables:
• an exogenous variable U that determines, among other things, the motivation and state
of mind of the arsonists. For simplicity, assume that R(U) = {u00, u10, u01, u11}; if
U = uij, then the first arsonist intends to start a fire iff i = 1 and the second arsonist
intends to start a fire iff j = 1. In both scenarios U = u11.
• endogenous variables ML1 and ML2, each either 0 or 1, where MLi = 0 if arsonist i
doesn’t drop the lit match and MLi = 1 if he does, for i = 1, 2.
• an endogenous variable FB for forest burns down, with values 0 (it doesn’t) and 1 (it
does).
Both scenarios have the same causal network (see Figure 2); they differ only in the equation for
FB. For the disjunctive scenario we have FFB(u, 1, 1) = FFB(u, 0, 1) = FFB(u, 1, 0) = 1 and
FFB(u, 0, 0) = 0 (where u ∈ R(U)); for the conjunctive scenario we have FFB(u, 1, 1) = 1
and FFB(u, 0, 0) = FFB(u, 1, 0) = FFB(u, 0, 1) = 0. In general, we expect that the causal
model for reasoning about forest fires would involve many other variables; in particular, vari-
ables for other potential causes of forest fires such lightning and unattended campfires; here we
focus on that part of the causal model that involves forest fires started by arsonists. Since for
causality we assume that all the relevant facts are given, we can assume here that it is known
that there were no unattended campfires and there was no lightning, which makes it safe to ig-
nore that portion of the causal model. Denote by M1 and M2 the (portion of the) causal models
associated with the disjunctive and conjunctive scenarios, respectively. The causal network for
the relevant portion of M1 and M2 is described in Figure 2.
ML1 ML2
U
FB
Figure 2: The causal network for M1 and M2.
Despite the differences in the underlying models, each of ML1 = 1 and ML2 = 1 is a
cause of FB = 1 in both scenarios. We present the argument for ML1 = 1 here. To show
that ML1 = 1 is a cause in M1 let ~Z = {ML1,FB}, so ~W = {ML2}. It is easy to see that
the contingency ML2 = 0 satisfies the two conditions in AC2. AC2(a) is satisfied because, in
the absence of the second arsonist (ML2 = 0), the first arsonist is necessary and sufficient for
the fire to occur (FB = 1). AC2(b) is satisfied because, if the first match is lit (ML1 = 1) the
contingency ML2 = 0 does not prevent the fire from burning the forest. Thus, ML1 = 1 is a
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cause of FB = 1 in M1. (Note that we needed to set ML2 to 0, contrary to fact, in order to
reveal the latent dependence of FB on ML1. Such a setting constitutes a structural change in
the original model, since it involves the removal of some structural equations.)
To see that ML1 = 1 is also a cause of FB = 1 in M2, again let ~Z = {ML1,FB} and
~W = {ML2}. Since (M2, u11) |= [ML1 ← 0,ML2 ← 1](FB = 0), AC2(a) is satisfied.
Moreover, since the value of ML2 required for AC2(a) is the same as its current value (i.e.,
w′ = w), AC2(b) is satisfied trivially.
This example also illustrates the need for the minimality condition AC3. For example, if
lighting a match qualifies as the cause of fire then lighting a match and sneezing would also
pass the tests of AC1 and AC2 and awkwardly qualify as the cause of fire. Minimality serves
here to strip “sneezing” and other irrelevant, over-specific details from the cause.
It might be argued that allowing disjunctive causes would be useful in this case to distin-
guish M1 from M2 as far as causality goes. A purely counterfactual definition of causality
would make ML1 = 1 ∨ ML2 = 1 a cause of FB = 1 in M1 (since, if ML1 = 1 ∨ ML2 = 1
were not true, then FB = 1 would not be true), but would make neither ML1 = 1 nor ML2 = 1
individually a cause (since, for example, if ML1 = 1 were not true in M1, FB = 1 would
still be true). Clearly, our definition does not enforce this intuition. As is well known (and
as the examples in Section 4 show) purely counterfactual definitions of causality have other
problems. We do not have a strong intuition as to the best way to deal with disjunction in the
context of causality, and believe that disallowing it is reasonably consistent with intuitions.
This example shows that causality and strong causality do not always coincide. It is not
hard to check that ML1 and ML2 are strong causes of FB in both scenarios. However, for ML1
to be a strong cause of FB in the conjunctive scenario, we must include ML2 in ~Z (so that ~W is
empty); if ML2 is in ~W , then AC2(c) fails. Thus, with strong causality, it is no longer the case
that we can take ~Z to consist only of variables on a path between the cause (ML1 = 1 in this
case) and the effect (FB = 1).
Moreover, suppose that we change the disjunctive scenario slightly by allowing either ar-
sonist to have guilt feelings and call the fire department. If one arsonist calls the fire depart-
ment, then the forest is saved, no matter what the other arsonist does. We can model this by
allowing ML1 and ML2 to have a value of 2 (where MLi = 2 if arsonist i calls the fire de-
partment). If either is 2, then FB = 0. In this situation, it is easy to check that now neither
ML1 = 1 nor ML2 = 1 by itself is a strong cause of FB = 1 in the disjunctive scenario.
ML1 = 1∧ML2 = 1 is a cause, but it seems strange that in the disjunctive scenario, we should
need to take both arsonists dropping a lit match to (strongly) cause the fire, just because we
allow for the possibility that an arsonist can call the fire department. Note that this also shows
that, in general, strong causes are not always single conjuncts.
This is a good place to illustrate the need for structural contingencies in the analysis of
actual causation. The reason we consider ML1 = 1 to be a cause of FB = 1 in M1 is that if
ML2 had been 0, rather than 1, FB would depend on ML1. In words, we imagine a situation
in which the second match is not lit, and we then reason counterfactually that the forest would
not have burned down if it were not for the first match.
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Although ML1 = 1 is a cause of FB = 1 in both the disjunctive and conjunctive scenarios,
the modelsM1 and M2 differ in regard to explanation, as we shall see in Part II of this paper. In
the disjunctive scenario, the lighting of one of the matches constitutes a reasonable explanation
of the forest burning down; not so in the conjunctive scenario. Intuitively, we feel that if both
matches are needed for establishing a forest fire, then both ML1 = 1 and ML2 = 1 together
would be required to fully explain the unfortunate fate of the forest; pointing to just one of
these events would only beg another “How come?” question, and would not stop any serious
investigating team from continuing its search for a more complete answer.
Finally, a remark concerning a contrastive extension to the definition of cause. When seek-
ing a cause of ϕ, we are often not just interested the occurrence versus nonoccurrence of ϕ,
but also the manner in which ϕ occurred, as opposed to some alternative way in which ϕ could
have occurred [Hitchcock 1996]. We say, for example, “X = x caused a fire in June as op-
posed to a fire in May.” If we assume that there is only enough wood in the forest for one forest
fire, the two contrasted events, “fire in May” and “fire in June”, exclude but do not comple-
ment each other (e.g., neither rules out a fire in April.) Definition 3.1 can easily be extended to
accommodate contrastive causation. We define “x caused ϕ, as opposed to ϕ′”, where ϕ and
ϕ′ are incompatible but not exhaustive, by simply replacing ¬ϕ with ϕ′ in condition AC2(a) of
the definition.
Contrast can also be applied to the antecedent, as in “Susan’s running rather than walking
to music class caused her fall.” There are actually two interpretations of this statement. The
first is that Susan’s running is a cause of her falling; moreover, had she walked, then she would
not have fallen. The second is that, while Susan’s running is a cause of her falling, Susan’s
walking also would have caused her to fall, but she did not in fact walk. We can capture both
interpretations of “X = x, rather than X = x′ for some value x′ 6= x, caused ϕ (in context ~u in
structure M)”. The first is (1) X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) and (2) (M,~u) |= [X ← x′]¬ϕ;
the second is (1′)X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) and (2′) AC2(b) holds forX = x′ and ϕ. That
is, the only reason that X = x′ is not the cause of ϕ is that X = x′ is not in fact what happened
in the actual world.12 (More generally, we can make sense of “X = x rather than Y = y caused
ϕ”.) Contrasting both the antecedent and the consequent components is straightforward, and
allows us to interpret sentences of the form: “Susan’s running rather than walking to music
class caused her to spend the night in the hospital, as opposed to her boyfriend’s apartment.”
4 Examples
In this section we show how our definition of actual causality handles some examples that have
caused problems for other definitions.
Example 4.1: The first example is due to Bennett (and appears in [Sosa and Tooley 1993,
12As Christopher Hitchcock [private communication, 2000] has pointed out, one of the roles of such contrastive
statements is to indicate that R(X), the set of possible values of X , should include x′. The sentence does not
make sense without this assumption.
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pp. 222–223]). Suppose that there was a heavy rain in April and electrical storms in the fol-
lowing two months; and in June the lightning took hold. If it hadn’t been for the heavy rain in
April, the forest would have caught fire in May. The question is whether the April rains caused
the forest fire. According to a naive counterfactual analysis, they do, since if it hadn’t rained,
there wouldn’t have been a forest fire in June. Bennett says “That is unacceptable. A good
enough story of events and of causation might give us reason to accept some things that seem
intuitively to be false, but no theory should persuade us that delaying a forest’s burning for a
month (or indeed a minute) is causing a forest fire.”
In our framework, as we now show, it is indeed false to say that the April rains caused
the fire, but they were a cause of there being a fire in June, as opposed to May. This seems
to us intuitively right. To capture the situation, it suffices to use a simple model with three
endogenous random variables:
• AS for “April showers”, with two values—0 standing for did not rain heavily in April and
1 standing for rained heavily in April;
• ES for “electric storms”, with four possible values: (0, 0) (no electric storms in either
May or June), (1,0) (electric storms in May but not June), (0,1) (storms in June but not
May), and (1,1) (storms in both May and June);
• and F for “fire”, with three possible values: 0 (no fire at all), 1 (fire in May), or 2 (fire in
June).
We do not describe the context explicitly, either here or in the other examples. Assume its
value ~u is such that it ensures that there is a shower in April, there are electric storms in both
May and June, there is sufficient oxygen, there are no other potential causes of fire (such as
dropped matches), no other inhibitors of fire (alert campers setting up a bucket brigade), and
so on. That is, we choose ~u so as to allow us to focus on the issue at hand and to ensure that
the right things happened (there was both fire and rain).
We will not bother writing out the details of the structural equations—they should be obvi-
ous, given the story (at least, for the context ~u); this is also the case for all the other examples
in this section. The causal network is simple: there are edges from AS to F and from ES to F .
It is easy to check that each of the following holds.
• AS = 1 is a cause of the June fire (F = 2) (taking ~W = {ES} and ~Z = {AS, F}) but not
of fire (F = 2 ∨ F = 1). That is, April showers are not a cause of the fire, but they are a
cause of the June fire.
• ES = (1, 1) is a cause of both F = 2 and (F = 1 ∨ F = 2). Having electric storms in
both May and June caused there to be a fire.
• AS = 1 ∧ ES = (1, 1) is not a cause of F = 2, because it violates the minimality
requirement of AC3; each conjunct alone is a cause of F = 2. Similarly, AS = 1∧ ES =
(1, 1) is not a cause of (F = 1 ∨ F = 2).
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Although we did not describe the context explicitly in Example 4.1, it still played a crucial
role. If we decide that the presence of oxygen is relevant then we must take this factor out of the
context and introduce it as an explicit endogenous variables. Doing so can affect the causality
picture (see Example 4.3). The next example already shows the importance of choosing an
appropriate granularity in modeling the causal process and its structure.
Example 4.2: The following story from [Hall 2004] is an example of preemption, where there
are two potential causes of an event, one of which preempts the other. An adequate definition
of causality must deal with preemption in all of its guises.
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets
there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s
would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
Common sense suggests that Suzy’s throw is the cause of the shattering, but Billy’s is not.
This holds in our framework too, but only if we model the story appropriately. Consider first a
coarse causal model, with three endogenous variables:
• ST for “Suzy throws”, with values 0 (Suzy does not throw) and 1 (she does);
• BT for “Billy throws”, with values 0 (he doesn’t) and 1 (he does);
• BS for “bottle shatters’, with values 0 (it doesn’t shatter) and 1 (it does).
Again, we have a simple causal network, with edges from both ST and BT to BS. In this simple
causal network, BT and ST play absolutely symmetric roles, with BS = ST ∨ BT; there is
nothing to distinguish BT from ST. Not surprisingly, both Billy’s throw and Suzy’s throw are
classified as causes of the bottle shattering in this model.
The trouble with this model is that it cannot distinguish the case where both rocks hit the
bottle simultaneously (in which case it would be reasonable to say that both ST = 1 and BT = 1
are causes of BS = 1) from the case where Suzy’s rock hits first. The model has to be refined
to express this distinction. One way is to invoke a dynamic model [Pearl 2000, p. 326]; this
is discussed below. A perhaps simpler way to gain expressiveness is to allow BS to be three
valued, with values 0 (the bottle doesn’t shatter), 1 (it shatters as a result of being hit by Suzy’s
rock), and 2 (it shatters as a result of being hit by Billy’s rock). We leave it to the reader to
check that ST = 1 is a cause of BS = 1, but BT = 1 is not (if Suzy hadn’t thrown but Billy had,
then we would have BS = 2). Thus, to some extent, this solves our problem. But it borders on
cheating; the answer is almost programmed into the model by invoking the relation “as a result
of”, which requires the identification of the actual cause.
A more useful choice is to add two new random variables to the model:
16
• BH for “Billy’s rock hits the (intact) bottle”, with values 0 (it doesn’t) and 1 (it does);
and
• SH for “Suzy’s rock hits the bottle”, again with values 0 and 1.
With this addition, we can go back to BS being two-valued. In this model, we have the causal
network shown in Figure 3, with the arrow SH → BH being inhibitory; BH = BT ∧ ¬SH (that
is, BH = 1 iff BT = 1 and SH = 0). Note that, to simplify the presentation, we have omitted the
exogenous variables from the causal network in Figure 3; we do so in some of the subsequent
figures as well. In addition, we have given the arrows only for the particular context of interest,
where Suzy throws first. In a context where Billy throws first, the arrow would go from BH to
SH rather than going from SH to BH, as it does in the figure.
ST
BT
BS
SH
BH
Figure 3: The rock-throwing example.
Now it is the case that ST = 1 is a cause of BS = 1. To satisfy AC2, we choose ~W = {BT}
and w′ = 0 and note that, because BT is set to 0, BS will track the setting of ST. Also note that
BT = 1 is not a cause of BS = 1; there is no partition ~Z ∪ ~W that satisfies AC2. Attempting the
symmetric choice ~W = {ST} and w′ = 0 would violate AC2(b) (with ~Z ′ = {BH}), because ϕ
becomes false when we set ST = 0 and restore BH to its current value of 0.
This example illustrates the need for invoking subsets of ~Z in AC2(b). (Additional reasons
are provided in Example A.3 in the appendix.) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′]ϕ holds if we
take ~Z = {BT,BH} and ~W = {ST, SH}, and thus without the requirement that AC2(b) hold
for all subsets of ~Z, BT = 1 would have qualified as a cause of BS = 1. Insisting that ϕ
remains unchanged when both ~W is set to ~w′ and ~Z ′ is set to ~z∗ (for an arbitrary subset ~Z ′ of
~Z) prevents us from choosing contingencies ~W that interfere with the active causal paths from
~X to ϕ.
This example also emphasizes an important moral. If we want to argue in a case of preemp-
tion that X = x is the cause of ϕ rather than Y = y, then there must be a random variable (BH
in this case) that takes on different values depending on whether X = x or Y = y is the actual
cause. If the model does not contain such a variable, then it will not be possible to determine
which one is in fact the cause. This is certainly consistent with intuition and the way we present
evidence. If we want to argue (say, in a court of law) that it was X’s shot that killed C rather
than Y ’s, then we present evidence such as the bullet entering C from the left side (rather than
the right side, which is how it would have entered had Y ’s shot been the lethal one). The side
from which the shot entered is the relevant random variable in this case. Note that the random
variable may involve temporal evidence (if Y ’s shot had been the lethal one, the death would
have occurred a few seconds later), but it certainly does not have to. This is indeed the rationale
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for Lewis’s [1973] criterion of causation in terms of a counterfactual-dependence chain. We
shall see, however, that our definition goes beyond this criterion.
It may be argued, of course, that by introducing the intermediate variables SH and BH in
Hall’s story we have also programmed the desired answer into the problem; after all, it is the
shattering of the bottle, not SH, which prevents BH. Pearl [2000, Section 10.3.5] analyzes a
similar late-preemption problem in a dynamic structural equation model, where variables are
time indexed, and shows that the selection of the first action as an actual cause of the effect
follows from conditions (similar to) AC1–AC3 even without specifying the owner of the hitting
ball. We now present a simplified adaptation of this analysis.
Let t1, t2, and t3 stand, respectively, for the time that Suzy threw her rock, the time that Billy
threw his rock, and the time that the bottle was found shattered. Let Hi and BSi be variables
indicating whether the bottle is hit (Hi) and was shattered (BSi) at time ti (where i = 1, 2, 3
and t1 < t2 < t3), with values 1 if hit (respectively, shattered), 0 if not. Roughly speaking,
if we let Ti be a variable representing “someone throws the ball at time ti” and take BS0 to be
vacuously false (i.e., always 0), then we would expect the following time-invariant equations
to hold for all times ti (not just t1, t2, and t3):
Hi = Ti ∧ ¬BSi−1
BSi = BSi−1 ∨Hi.
That is, the bottle is hit at time ti if someone throws the ball at time ti and the bottle wasn’t
already shattered at time ti. Similarly, the bottle is shattered at time ti either if it was already
shattered at time ti−1 or it was hit at time ti.
Since in this case we consider only times t1, t2, and t3, we get the following structural
equations, where we have left in the variable T3 to bring out the essential invariance:
H1 = ST
BS1 = H1
H2 = BT ∧ ¬BS1
BS2 = BS1 ∨H2
H3 = T3 ∧ ¬BS2
BS3 = BS2 ∨H3.
The diagram associated with this model is shown in Figure 4. In addition to these generic
equations, the story also specifies that the context is such that
ST = 1,BT = 1, T3 = 0.
The causal network in Figure 4 describes the situation.
It is not hard to show that ST = 1 is a cause of BS3 = 1 (taking ~W = {BT} in AC2 and
w′ = 0). BT = 1 is not a cause of BS3 = 1; it fails AC2(b) for every partition ~Z ∪ ~W . To see
this, note that to establish counterfactual dependence between BS3 and BT, we must assign H2
18
BS1
H1
ST
BS2
H2
BT
H3
BS3
3T
Figure 4: Time-invariant rock throwing.
to ~Z, assign BS1 to ~W , and impose the contingency BS1 = 0. But this contingency violates
condition AC2(b), since it results in BS3 = 0 when we restore H2 to 0 (its current value).
Two features are worth emphasizing in this example. First, Suzy’s throw is declared a
cause of the outcome event BS3 = 1 even though her throw did not hasten, delay, or change
any property of that outcome. This can be made clearer by considering another outcome event,
J4 = “Joe was unable to drink his favorite chocolate cocktail from that bottle on Tuesday night.”
Being a consequence of BS3, J4 will also be classified as having been caused by Suzy’s throw,
not by Billy’s, although J4 would have occurred at precisely the same time and in the same
manner had Suzy not thrown the ball. This implies that hastening or delaying the outcome
cannot be taken as the basic principle for deciding actual causation, a principle advocated by
Paul [1998].
Second, Suzy’s throw is declared a cause of BS3 = 1 even though there is no counterfactual
dependence chain between the two (i.e., a chain A1 → A2 → . . . → Ak where each event is
counterfactually dependent on its predecessor). The existence of such a chain was proposed
by Lewis [1973] as a necessary criterion for causation in cases involving preemption.13 In the
actual context, BS2 does not depend (counterfactually) on either BS1 or onH2; the bottle would
be shattered at time t2 even if it were unshattered at time t1 (since Billy’s rock would have hit
it), as well as if it were hit (miraculously) at time t2.
Example 4.3: Can not performing an action be (part of) a cause? Consider the following story,
again taken from (an early version of) [Hall 2004]:
Billy, having stayed out in the cold too long throwing rocks, contracts a serious
but nonfatal disease. He is hospitalized and treated on Monday, so is fine Tuesday
morning.
But now suppose the doctor does not treat Billy on Monday. Is the doctor’s omission to
treat Billy a cause of Billy’s being sick on Tuesday? It seems that it should be, and indeed it
is according to our analysis. Suppose that ~u is the context where, among other things, Billy is
13Lewis [1986, Appendix D] later amended this criterion to deal with problematic cases similar to that presented
her.
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sick on Monday and the situation is such that the doctor forgets to administer the medication
Monday. (There is much more to the context ~u, as we shall shortly see.) It seems reasonable
that the model should have two random variables:
• MT for “Monday treatment”, with values 0 (the doctor does not treat Billy on Monday)
and 1 (he does); and
• BMC for “Billy’s medical condition”, with values 0 (recovered) and 1 (still sick).
Sure enough, in the obvious causal model, MT = 0 is a cause of BMC = 1.
This may seem somewhat disconcerting at first. Suppose there are 100 doctors in the hos-
pital. Although only one of them was assigned to Billy (and he forgot to give medication), in
principle, any of the other 99 doctors could have given Billy his medication. Is the fact that
they didn’t give him the medication also part of the cause of him still being sick on Tuesday?
In the particular model that we have constructed, the other doctors’ failure to give Billy
his medication is not a cause, since we have no random variables to model the other doctors’
actions, just as we had no random variable in Example 4.1 to model the presence of oxygen.
Their lack of action is part of the context. We factor it out because (quite reasonably) we want
to focus on the actions of Billy’s doctor. If we had included endogenous random variables
corresponding to the other doctors, then they too would be causes of Billy’s being sick on
Tuesday.
With this background, we continue with Hall’s modification of the original story.
Suppose that Monday’s doctor is reliable, and administers the medicine first thing
in the morning, so that Billy is fully recovered by Tuesday afternoon. Tuesday’s
doctor is also reliable, and would have treated Billy if Monday’s doctor had failed
to . . . And let us add a twist: one dose of medication is harmless, but two doses are
lethal.
Is the fact that Tuesday’s doctor did not treat Billy the cause of him being alive (and recovered)
on Wednesday morning?
The causal model for this story is straightforward. There are three random variables: MT for
Monday’s treatment (1 if Billy was treated Monday; 0 otherwise), TT for Tuesday’s treatment
(1 if Billy was treated Tuesday; 0 otherwise), and BMC for Billy’s medical condition (0 if Billy
is fine both Tuesday morning and Wednesday morning; 1 if Billy is sick Tuesday morning, fine
Wednesday morning; 2 if Billy is sick both Tuesday and Wednesday morning; 3 if Billy is fine
Tuesday morning and dead Wednesday morning). We can then describe Billy’s condition as a
function of the four possible combinations of treatment/nontreatment on Monday and Tuesday.
In the causal network corresponding to this causal model, shown in Figure 5, there is an
edge from MT to TT, since whether the Tuesday treatment occurs depends on whether the
Monday treatment occurs, and edges from both MT and TT to BMC, since Billy’s medical
condition depends on both treatments.
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Figure 5: Billy’s medical condition.
In this causal model, it is true that MT = 1 is a cause of BMC = 0, as we would expect—
because Billy is treated Monday, he is not treated on Tuesday morning, and thus recovers
Wednesday morning. MT = 1 is also a cause of TT = 0, as we would expect, and TT = 0 is
a cause of Billy’s being alive (BMC = 0 ∨ BMC = 1 ∨ BMC = 2). However, MT = 1 is not
a cause of Billy’s being alive. It fails condition AC2(a): setting MT = 0 still leads to Billy’s
being alive (with W = ∅). Note that it would not help to take ~W = {TT}. For if TT = 0,
then Billy is alive no matter what MT is, while if TT = 1, then Billy is dead when MT has its
original value, so AC2(b) is violated (with ~Z ′ = ∅).
This shows that causality is not transitive, according to our definitions. Although MT = 1
is a cause of TT = 0 and TT = 0 is a cause of BMC = 0∨BMC = 1∨BMC = 2, MT = 1 is not
a cause of BMC = 0 ∨ BMC = 1 ∨ BMC = 2. Nor is causality closed under right weakening:
MT = 1 is a cause of BMC = 0, which logically implies BMC = 0 ∨ BMC = 1 ∨ BMC = 2,
which is not caused by MT = 1.14
Hall [2000, 2004] discusses the issue of transitivity of causality, and suggests that there
is a tension between the desideratum that causality be transitive and the desideratum that we
allow causality due to the failure of some event to occur. He goes on to suggest that there are
actually two concepts of causation: one corresponding to counterfactual dependence and the
other corresponding to “production”, wherebyA causesB ifA helped to produceB. Causation
by production is transitive; causation by dependence is not.
Our definition certainly has some features of both counterfactual dependence and of production—
AC2(a) captures some of the intuition of counterfactual dependence (ifA hadn’t happened then
B wouldn’t have happened if ~W = ~w′) and AC2(b) captures some of the features of production
(A forced B to happen, even if ~W = ~w′). Nevertheless, we do not require two separate notions
to deal with these concerns.
Moreover, whereas Hall attributes the failure of transitivity to a distinction between pres-
ence and absence of events, according to our definition, the requirement of transitivity causes
problems whether or not we allow causality due to the failure of some event to occur. It is easy
enough to construct a story whose causal model has precisely the same formal structure as that
above, except that TT = 0 now means that the treatment was given and TT = 1 means it wasn’t.
(Billy starts a course of treatment on Monday which, if discontinued once started, is fatal . . . )
14Lewis [2000] implicitly assumes right weakening in his defense of transitivity. For example, he says “. . . it is
because of Black’s move that Red’s victory is caused one way rather than another. That means, I submit, that in
each of these cases, Black’s move did indeed cause Red’s victory. Transitivity succeeds.” But there is a critical
(and, to us, unjustifiable) leap in this reasoning. As we already saw in Example 4.1, the fact that April rains cause
a fire in June does not mean that they cause the fire.
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Again, we don’t get transitivity, but now it is because an event occurred (the treatment was
given), not because it failed to occur.
Lewis [1986, 2000] insists that causality is transitive, partly to be able to deal with preemp-
tion [Lewis 1986]. As Hitchcock [2001] points out, our account handles the standard examples
of preemption without needing to invoke transitivity, which, as Lewis’s own examples show,
leads to counterintuitive conclusions.
Example 4.4: This example considers the problem of what Hall calls double prevention. Again,
the story is taken from Hall [2004]:
Suzy and Billy have grown up, just in time to get involved in World War III. Suzy is
piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target, and Billy is piloting a
fighter as her lone escort. Along comes an enemy fighter plane, piloted by Enemy.
Sharp-eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s plane
goes down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and the bombing takes place
as planned.
Does Billy deserve part of the cause for the success of the mission? After all, if he hadn’t
pulled the trigger, Enemy would have eluded him and shot down Suzy. Intuitively, it seems that
the answer is yes, and the obvious causal model gives us this. Suppose we have the following
random variables:
• BPT for “Billy pulls trigger”, with values 0 (he doesn’t) and 1 (he does);
• LE for “Enemy eludes Billy”, with values 0 (he doesn’t) and 1 (he does);
• LSS for “Enemy shoots Suzy”, with values 0 (he doesn’t) and 1 (he does);
• SST for “Suzy shoots target”, with values 0 (she doesn’t) and 1 (she does);
• TD for “target destroyed”, with values 0 (it isn’t) and 1 (it is).
The causal network corresponding to this model is just
BPT−−◮ LE −−◮ LSS −−◮ SST −−◮ TD.
In this model, BPT = 1 is a cause of TD = 1. Of course, SST = 1 is a cause of TD = 1 as
well. It may be somewhat disconcerting to observe that BPT = 1 is also a cause of SST = 1.
It seems strange to think of Billy being a cause of Suzy doing something she was planning to
do all along. Part of the problem is that, according to our definition (and all other definitions
of causality that we are aware of), if A enables B, then A is a cause of B. Arguably another
part of the problem with BPT = 1 being a cause of SST = 1 and TD = 1 is that it seems to
leave Suzy out of the picture altogether. We can bring Suzy more into the picture by having
a random variable corresponding to Suzy’s plan or intention. Suppose that we add a random
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BPT LE LSS SST TD
SPS
Figure 6: Blowing up the target.
variable SPS for “Suzy plans to shoot the target”, with values 0 (she doesn’t) and 1 (she does).
Assuming that Suzy shoots if she plans to, we then get the following causal network, where
now SST depends on both LSS and SPS:
In this case, it is easy to check that each of BPT = 1 and SPS = 1 is a cause of TD = 1.
BPT LE LSS SST TD
HPT SPS
Figure 7: Blowing up the target (refined version).
Hall suggests that further complications arise if we add a second fighter plane escorting
Suzy, piloted by Hillary. Billy still shoots down Enemy, but if he hadn’t, Hillary would have.
The natural way of dealing with this is to add just one more variable HPT representing Hillary’s
pulling the trigger iff LE = 1 (see Figure 7), but then, using the naive counterfactual criterion,
one might conclude that the target will be destroyed (TD = 1) regardless of Billy’s action, and
BPT = 1 would lose its “actual cause” status (of TD = 1). Fortunately, our definition goes
beyond this naive criterion and classifies BPT = 1 as a cause of TD = 1, as expected. This can
be seen by noting that the partition ~Z = {BPT, LE, LSS, SST, TD}, ~W = {HPT, SPS} satisfies
conditions AC1–AC3 (with w′ such that HPT = 0 and SPS = 1). The intuition rests, again,
on structural contingencies; although Billy’s action seems superfluous under ideal conditions,
it becomes essential under a contingency in which Hillary would fail in her mission to shoot
Enemy. This contingency is represented by setting HPT to 0 (in testing AC2(a)), irrespective
of LE.
5 A More Refined Definition
We labeled our definition “preliminary”, suggesting that there are some situations it cannot
deal with. The following example illustrates the problem.
Example 5.1: Consider Example 4.2, where both Suzy and Billy throw a rock at a bottle, but
Suzy’s hits first. Now suppose that there is a noise which causes Suzy to delay her throw
slightly, but that she still throws before Billy. Suppose that we model this situation using the
approach described in Figure 4, adding three extra variables, N (where N = 0 if there is no
noise and N = 1 if there is a noise), H1.5 (which is 1 if the bottle is hit at time t1.5, where
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t1 < t1.5 < t2, and 0 otherwise) and BS1.5 (which is 1 if the bottle is shattered at time t1.5
and 0 otherwise). In the actual situation, there is a noise and the bottle shatters at t1.5, so
N = 1, H1.5 = 1, and BS1.5 = 1. Just as in Example 4.2, we can show that Suzy’s throw
is a cause of the bottle shattering and Billy’s throw is not. Not surprisingly, N = 1 is a
cause of BS1.5 = 1 (without the noise, the bottle would have shattered at time 1). Somewhat
disconcertingly though, N = 1 is also a cause of the bottle shattering. That is, N = 1 is a
cause of BS3 = 1.
This seems unreasonable. Intuitively, the bottle would have shattered whether or not there
had been a noise. However, this intuition is actually not correct in our causal model. Consider
the contingency where Suzy’s throw hits the bottle. If N = 1 and BS1 = 0, then the bottle does
shatter at t1.5. Given this, it easily follows that, according to our definition, N = 1 is a cause
of BS3 = 1.15
The problem here is caused by what might be considered an extremely unreasonable sce-
nario: If N = 1 and BS1 = 0, the bottle does not shatter despite being hit by Suzy’s rock. Do
we want to consider such scenarios? That is up to the modeler. Intuitively, if we allow such
scenarios, then the noise ought to be a cause; if not, then it shouldn’t.
It is easy to modify our preliminary definition so as to be able to capture this intuition. We
take an extended causal model to now be a tuple (S,F , E), where (S,F) is a causal model,
and E is a set of allowable settings for the endogenous variables. That is, if the endogenous
variables are X1, . . . , Xn, then (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ E if X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn is an allowable
setting. We say that a setting of a subset of the endogenous variables is allowable if it can be
extended to a setting in E . We then slightly modify clauses AC2(a) and (b) in the definition of
causality to restrict to allowable settings. In the special case where E consists of all settings,
this definition reduces to the definition we gave in Section 3. We can deal with Example 5.1 in
extended causal models by disallowing settings where BS1 = 0∧H1 = 1. This essentially puts
us back in the original setting. The following example further illustrates the need to be able to
deal with “unreasonable” settings.
Example 5.2: Fred has his finger severed by a machine at the factory (FS = 1). Fortunately,
Fred is covered by a health plan. He is rushed to the hospital, where his finger is sewn back
on. A month later, the finger is fully functional (FF = 1). In this story, we would not want to
say that FS = 1 is a cause of FF = 1 and, indeed, according to our definition, it is not, since
FF = 1 whether or not FS = 1 (in all contingencies satisfying AC2(b)).
However, suppose we introduce a new element to the story, representing a nonactual struc-
tural contingency: Larry the Loanshark may be waiting outside the factory with the intention
of cutting off Fred’s finger, as a warning to him to repay his loan quickly. Let LL represent
whether or not Larry is waiting and let LC represent whether Larry cuts off Fred’s finger. If
Larry cuts off Fred’s finger, he will throw it away, so Fred will not be able to get it sewn back
on. In the actual situation, LL = LC = 0; Larry is not waiting and Larry does not cut off
15We thank Chris Hitchcock for bringing this example to our attention.
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Fred’s finger. So, intuitively, there seems to be no harm in adding this fanciful element to the
story. Or is there? Suppose that, if Fred’s finger is cut off in the factory, then Larry will not be
able to cut off the finger himself (since Fred will be rushed off to the hospital). Now FS = 1
becomes a cause of FF = 1. For in the structural contingency where LL = 1, if FS = 0 then
FF = 0 (Larry will cut off Fred’s finger and throw it away, so it will not become functional
again). Moreover, if FS = 1, then LC = 0 and FF = 1, just as in the actual situation.16
If we really want to view Larry’s cutting off Fred’s finger as totally fanciful, then we simply
disallow all settings where LL = 1. On the other hand, if having fingers cut off in a way that
they cannot be put on again is rather commonplace, then it seems more reasonable to view the
accident as a cause of Fred’s finger being functional a month after the accident.
In extended models, it is also straightforward to deal with problems of causation by omis-
sion.
Example 5.3: Hall and Paul [2003] give an example due to Sarah McGrath suggesting that
there may be a difference between causation by omission and causation by commission:
Suppose Suzy goes away on vacation, leaving her favorite plant in the hands of
Billy, who has promised to water it. Billy fails to do so. The plant dies—but
would not have, had Billy watered it. . . . Billy’s failure to water the plant caused
its death. But Vladimir Putin also failed to water Suzy’s plant. And, had he done
so, it would not have died. Why do we also not count his omission as a cause of
the plant’s death?
Billy is clearly a cause in the obvious structural model. So is Vladimir Putin, if we do not
disallow any settings and include Putin watering the plant as one of the endogenous variables.
However, if we simply disallow the setting where Vladimir Putin waters the plant. then Billy’s
failure to water the plants is a cause, and Putin’s failure is not. We could equally well get this
result by not taking Putin’s watering the plant as one of the endogenous variables in the model.
(Indeed, we suspect that most people modeling the problem would not include this as a random
variable.)
Are we giving ourselves too much flexibility here? We believe not. It is up to a modeler to
defend her choice of model. A model which does not allow us to consider Putin watering the
plant can be defended in the obvious way: that is a scenario too ridiculous to consider. On the
other hand, if Suzy’s sister Maggie (who has a key to the house) also came by to check up on
things, then it does not seem so unreasonable for Suzy to get slightly annoyed at Maggie for
not watering the plant, even if she was not supposed to be the one responsible for it. Intuitively,
it seems reasonable not to disallow the setting where Maggie waters the plant.
16We thank Eric Hiddleston for bringing this example to our attention. The example is actually a variant of one
originally due to Kvart [1991], although Kvart’s example did not include Larry the Loanshark and was intended
to show a violation of transitivity.
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Considering only allowable settings plays a more significant role in our framework than
just that of allowing us to ignore fanciful scenarios. As the following example shows, it helps
clarify the relationship between various models of a story.
Example 5.4: This example concerns what Hall calls the distinction between causation and
determination. Again, we quote Hall [2000]:
The engineer is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. A train approaches
in the distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the right-hand
track, instead of the left. Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the train arrives at
its destination all the same . . .
Again, our causal model gets this right. Suppose we have three random variables:
• F for “flip”, with values 0 (the engineer doesn’t flip the switch) and 1 (she does);
• T for “track”, with values 0 (the train goes on the left-hand track) and 1 (it goes on the
right-hand track); and
• A for “arrival”, with values 0 (the train does not arrive at the point of reconvergence) and
1 (it does).
Now it is easy to see that flipping the switch (F = 1) causes the train to go down the left-hand
track (T = 0), but does not cause it to arrive (A = 1), thanks to AC2(a)—whether or not the
switch is flipped, the train arrives.
However, our proposal goes one step beyond this simple picture. Suppose that we model
the tracks using two variables:
• LT for “left-track”, with values 1 (the train goes on the left-hand track) and 0 (it does not
go on the left-hand track); and
• RT for “right-track”, with values 1 (the train goes on the right-hand track) and 0 (it does
not go on the right-hand track).
The resulting causal diagram is shown in Figure 8; it is isomorphic to a class of problems
that Pearl [2000] calls “switching causation”. It seems reasonable to disallow settings where
RT = LT = 1; a train cannot go down more than one track. If we do not disallow any other
settings, then, lo and behold, this representation classifies F = 1 as a cause of A. At first sight,
this may seem counterintuitive: Can a change in representation turn a non-cause into a cause?
It can and it should! The change to a two-variable model is not merely syntactic, but
represents a profound change in the story. The two-variable model depicts the tracks as two
independent mechanisms, thus allowing one track to be set (by action or mishap) to false (or
true) without affecting the other. Specifically, this permits the disastrous mishap of flipping the
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Figure 8: Flipping the switch.
switch while the left track is malfunctioning. More formally, it allows a setting where F = 1
and RT = 0. Such abnormal settings are imaginable and expressible in the two-variable model,
but not in the one-variable model. Of course, if we disallow settings where F = 1 and RT = 0,
or where F = 0 and LT = 0, then we are essentially back at the earlier model. The potential
for such settings is precisely what renders F = 1 a cause of A in the model of Figure 8.17
Is flipping the switch a legitimate cause of the train’s arrival? Not in ideal situations, where
all mechanisms work as specified. But this is not what causality (and causal modeling) are
all about. Causal models earn their value in abnormal circumstances, created by structural
contingencies, such as the possibility of a malfunctioning track. It is this possibility that should
enter our mind whenever we decide to designate each track as a separate mechanism (i.e.,
equation) in the model and, keeping this contingency in mind, it should not be too odd to name
the switch position a cause of the train arrival (or non-arrival).
Example 5.4 gives some insight into the process of model construction. While there is no
way of proving that a given model is the “right” model, it is clearly important for a model
to have enough random variables to express what the modeler considers to be all reasonable
situations. On the other hand, by allowing for the possibility of restricting the set of possible
settings in the definition of causality, we do not penalize the modeler for inadvertently having
too many possible settings.
Example 5.5: The next pair of examples were introduced by Schaffer [2000] under the name
trumping preemption. To quote Schaffer:
Imagine that it is a law of magic that the first spell cast on a given day match the
enchantment that midnight. Suppose that at noon Merlin casts a spell (the first
that day) to turn the prince into a frog, that at 6:00 PM Morgana casts a spell (the
only other that day) to turn the prince into a frog, and that at midnight the prince
becomes a frog.
Clearly Merlin is a cause of the enchantment. What about Morgana? There is an intuition that
Merlin should be the only cause, since his spell “trumps” Morgana’s. Can this be captured in a
causal model?
A coarse-grained model for this story has three variables:
17This can be seen by noting that condition AC2 is satisfied by the partition ~Z = {F, LT, A}, ~W = {LT}, and
choosing w′ as the setting LT = 0.
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• Mer, with values 0 (Merlin did not cast a spell), 1 (Merlin cast a prince-to-frog spell in
the morning), and 2 (Merlin cast a prince-to-frog spell in the evening);18
• Mor, with values 0, 1, 2, with interpretations similar to those for Mer;
• F , the outcome, with values 0 (prince) or 1 (frog).
In this model, with the obvious structural equations, both Merlin’s spell and Morgana’s spell
are the causes of the transmogrification. (We do need to specify what happens if both Merlin
and Morgana cast a spell at the same time. The choice does not affect the analysis.) The
problem, of course, is that the model does not capture how Merlin’s spell trumps Morgana’s;
Merlin and Morgana are being treated completely symmetrically. In particular, the model fails
to represent the temporal precedence requirement that “the first spell on a given day match the
enchantment that midnight”.
To prevent Morgana’s spell from being a cause, we can use a model similar in spirit to that
used in the rock-throwing example. We need two additional variables, MerE (for Merlin’s spell
effective) and MorE (for Morgana’s spell effective). The picture is very similar to Figure 3,
with MerE and MorE replacing SH and BH:
MerE
Mer
MorE
Mor
F
Figure 9: Merlin and Morgana.
(Again, we are not specifying what happens if Merlin and Morgana throw at the same time,
because it is irrelevant to the analysis.) In this model Morgana’s spell is not a cause; it fails
AC2(b). This again emphasizes the point that causality is relative to a model. It is up to the
modeler to ensure that the structural equations properly represent the dynamics in the story.
The second example of trumping preemption is actually due to Bas van Fraassen. Quoting
Schaffer again:
Imagine that . . . the major and the sergeant stand before the corporal, both shout
“Charge!” at the same time, and the corporal decides to charge.
Schaffer (and Lewis [2000]) claim that, because orders from higher-ranking soldiers trump
those of lower-ranking soldiers, this is again a case of trumping preemption: the major is a
cause of the charge; the sergeant is not.
18The variable could take on more values, allowing for other spells that Merlin could cast and other times he
could cast them, but this would not affect the analysis.
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Our intuition does not completely agree with that of Schaffer and Lewis in this example. In
what seems to us the most obvious model of the story, both the sergeant’s order and the major’s
order are the causes of the advance. Consider the model described in Figure 10. Assume for
definiteness that the sergeant and the major can each either order an advance, order a retreat, or
do nothing. Thus, M and S can each take three values, 1,−1, or 0, depending on what they do.
A describes what the solders do; as the story suggests, A = M if M 6= 0; otherwise A = S.
In the actual context, M = S = A = 1. In this model, it is easy to see that both M = 1 and
S = 1 are causes of A = 1, although M = 1 is a strong cause of A = 1, while S = 1 is not.
M S
A
Figure 10: A simple model of the sergeant and the major
Of course, it is possible to get a model of the story that arguably captures trumping by
modeling the fact that if the major actually issues an order, then the sergeant is ignored. To
do this, we add a new variable SE that captures the sergeant’s “effective” order. If the major
does not issue any orders (i.e., if M = 0), then SE = S. If the major does issue an order,
then SE = 0; the sergeant’s order is effectively blocked. In this model, illustrated in Figure 11,
A = M if M 6= 0; otherwise, A = SE.
M S
A
SE
Figure 11: A model of the sergeant and the major that captures trumping.
In this model, the major does cause the corporal to advance, but the sergeant does not.
For suppose we want to argue that S = 1 causes A = 1. The obvious thing to do is to take
~W = {M} and ~Z = {S, SE, A}. However, this choice does not satisfy AC2(b), since ifM = 0,
SE = 0 (its original value), and S = 1, then A = 0, not 1. We leave it to the reader to check
that it does not help to put SE into ~W . The key point is that this more refined model allows
a setting where M = 0, S = 1, and A = 0 (because SE = 0). That is, despite the sergeant
issuing an order to attack and the major being silent, the corporal does nothing (intuitively,
because of some perceived “interference” from the major, despite the major being silent).
Schaffer [2000, p. 175–176] seems to want to disallow this model, or at least to allow other
mechanisms for trumping. There may well be other mechanisms for trumping. We believe that
if they are spelled out carefully, it should also be possible to capture them using an appropriate
causal model. However, we cannot speak about trumping preemption in our framework without
29
being explicit as to how the trumping takes place.19
It is important to note that the diversity of answers in these examples does not reflect undis-
ciplined freedom to tinker with the model so as to get the desired answer. Quite the contrary; it
reflects an ambiguity in the original specification of the story, which our definition helps disam-
biguate. Each of the models considered reflects a legitimate interpretation of the story in terms
of a distinct model of the corporal’s attention-focusing strategy. For example, Figure 10 de-
scribes the corporal’s strategy as a single input-output mechanism, with no intermediate steps.
Figure 11 refines that model into a two-step process where the corporal first determines whether
the major is silent or speaking and, in the latter case, follow the major’s command. Naturally,
the major should be deemed the cause of advancing (in our scenario) given this strategy. We
can also imagine a completely different strategy where the sergeant, not the major, will be
deemed the cause of advancing. If the corporal first determines whether or not there is con-
flict between the two commanders and then, in case of no conflict, pays full attention to the
sergeant (perhaps because his dialect is clearer, or his posture less intimidating), it would make
perfect sense then to say that the sergeant was the cause of advancing. Structural-equation
models provide a language for formally representing these fine but important distinctions, and
our definition translates these distinctions into different classifications of actual causes.
Example 5.6: Consider an example originally due to McDermott [1995], and also considered
by Collins [2000], Lewis [2000], and Hitchcock [2001]. A ball is caught by a fielder. A little
further along its path there is a solid wall and, beyond that, a window. Does the fielder’s catch
cause the window to remain unbroken? As Lewis [2000] says,
We are ambivalent. We can think: Yes—the fielder and the wall between them
prevented the window from being broken, but the wall had nothing to do with it,
since the ball never reached the wall; so it must have been the fielder. Or instead
we can think: No—the wall kept the window safe regardless of what the fielder
did or didn’t do.
Lewis argues that our ambivalence in this case ought to be respected, and both solutions
should be allowed. We can give this ambivalence formal expression in our framework. If we
make both the wall and the fielder endogenous variables, then the fielder’s catch is a cause of
the window being safe, under the assumption that the fielder not catching the ball and the wall
not being there is considered a reasonable scenario. Note that if we also have a variable for
whether the ball hit the wall, then the presence of the wall is not a cause for the window’s being
safe in this case; the analysis is essentially the same as that of the Suzy-Billy rock-throwing
example in Figure 3.20 On the other hand, if we take it for granted the wall’s presence (either by
making the wall an exogenous variable, not including it in the model, or not allowing situations
19Of course, we could extend the framework to allow epistemic considerations, using a standard possible-
worlds framework, where the “worlds” are causal models. An agent could then be uncertain about how the
trumping takes place, while still knowing that the major is the cause of charge, not the sergeant. Nevertheless, in
each of the possible worlds, the trumping mechanism would still have to be specified.
20We thank Chris Hitchcock for making this point.
30
where it doesn’t block the ball if the fielder doesn’t catch it), then the fielder’s catch is not a
cause of the window being safe. It would remain safe no matter what the fielder did, in any
structural contingency.
This example again stresses the importance of the choice of model, and thinking through
what we want to vary and what we want to keep fixed. (Much the same point is made by
Hitchcock [2001].)
This is perhaps a good place to compare our approach with that of Yablo [2002]. The
approaches have some surface similarities. They both refine the standard notion of counterfac-
tual dependence. We consider counterfactual dependence under some (possibly counterfactual)
contingency. Yablo considers counterfactual dependence under the assumption that some fea-
ture of (or events in) the actual world remains fixed. The problem is, as Yablo himself shows,
that for any ~X = ~x and ϕ that actually happens, we can find some feature of the world that we
can hold fixed such that ϕ depends on ~X = ~x. Take ψ to be the formula ~X = ~x⇔ ϕ. If ~X = ~x
and ϕ are both true in the actual situation, then so is ψ. Moreover, under the assumption that
ψ holds, ϕ depends counterfactually on ~X = ~x. In the closest world to the actual world where
~X = ~x∧ψ holds, ϕ must hold, while in the closest world to the actual world where ~X 6= ~x∧ψ
holds, ¬ϕ must hold. To counteract such difficulties, Yablo imposes a requirement of “natural-
ness” on what can be held fixed. With these requirement, a more refined notion of causation
is that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ if there is some ψ true in the actual world that can be held fixed
so as to make ϕ counterfactually depend on ~X = ~x, and no other “more natural” ψ′ can be
found that makes the dependence “artificial”. While Yablo does give some objective criteria
for naturalness, much of the judgment is subjective, and it is not clear how to model it formally.
In other words, it is not clear what relationships among variables and events must be encoded
in the model in order to formally decide whether one event is “more natural” than another,
or whether no other “more natural” event can be contrived. The analogous decisions in our
formulation are managed by condition AC2(b), which distinguishes unambiguously between
admissible and inadmissible contingencies. In addition, it restricts the form of contingencies;
only contingencies of the form ~W = ~w are allowed, and not, for example, contingencies such
as X = Y .
6 Discussion
We have presented a formal representation of causal knowledge and a principled way of deter-
mining actual causes from such knowledge. We have shown that the counterfactual approach
to causation, in the tradition of Hume and Lewis, need not be abandoned; the language of coun-
terfactuals, once supported with structural semantics, can yield a plausible and elegant account
of actual causation that resolves major difficulties in the traditional account.
The essential principles of our account include
• using structural equations to model causal mechanisms and counterfactuals;
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• using uniform counterfactual notation to encode and distinguish facts, actions, outcomes,
processes, and contingencies;
• using structural contingencies to uncover latent counterfactual dependencies;
• careful screening of these contingencies to avoid tampering with the causal processes to
be uncovered.
Our approach also stresses the importance of careful modeling. In particular, it shows that
the choice of model granularity can have a significant effect on the causality relation. This
perhaps can be viewed as a deficiency in the approach. We prefer to think that it shows that
the internal structures of the processes assumed to underlie causal stories play a crucial role in
our judgment of actual causation, and that it is important therefore to properly cast such stories
in a language that represents those structures explicitly. Our approach is built on just such a
language.
As the examples have shown, much depends on choosing the “right” set of variables with
which to model a situation, which ones to make exogenous, and which to make endogenous.
While the examples have suggested some heuristics for making appropriate choices, we do not
have a general theory for how to make these choices. We view this as an important direction for
future research. (See [Hitchcock 2003] for some preliminary discussion of the issue of finding
“good” models.)
While we do feel that it should be possible to delineate good guidelines for constructing
appropriate models, ultimately, the choice of model is a subjective one. The choice of which
variables to focus on and which to ignore (that is, the choice of exogenous and endogenous
variables) and the decision as to which contingencies to take seriously (that is, which settings to
take as allowable) is subjective, and depends to some extent on what the model is being used for.
(This issue arises frequently in discussions of causality and the law [Hart and Honore´ 1985].)
By way of contrast, most of the work in the philosophy literature seems to implicitly assume
that, in any given situation, there is one correct answer as to whether A is a cause of B. Rather
than starting with a model, there are assumed to be events in the world; new events can be
created to some extent as needed, leading to issues like “fragility” of events and how fine-
grained events should be (see, for example, [Lewis 2000; Paul 2000]).
of causality is “right”. However, the fact that it deals so well with the many difficult exam-
ples in the literature does provide some support for the reasonableness of the definition. Further
support is provided by the ease with which it can be extended to define other notions, such as
explanation (see Part II of this paper) and responsibility and blame [Chockler and Halpern 2004].
A Appendix: Some Technical Issues
In this appendix, we consider some technical issues related to the definition of causality.
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A.1 The active causal process
We first show that, without loss of generality, the variables in the set ~Z in condition AC2 of the
definition of causality can all be taken to be on a path from a variable in ~X to a variable in ϕ.
In fact, they can, without loss of generality, be assumed to change value when ~X is set to ~x′
and ~W is set to ~w′. More formally, consider the following strengthening of AC2:
AC2′. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the
variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that, if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for Z ∈ ~Z, then
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′](¬ϕ ∧ Z 6= z∗) for all Z ∈ ~Z;
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z.
As we now show, we could have replaced AC2 by AC2′; it would not have affected the
notion of causality. Say that ~X = ~x is an actual cause′ of ϕ if AC1, AC2′, and AC3 hold.
Proposition A.1: ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ iff ~X = ~x is an actual cause′ of ϕ.
Proof: The “if” direction is immediate, since AC2′ clearly implies AC2. For the “only if”
direction, suppose that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ. Let (~Z, ~W ) be the partition of V and (~x′, ~w′) the
setting of the variables in ( ~X, ~W ) guaranteed to exist by AC2. Let ~Z ′ ⊆ ~Z consist of variables
Z ∈ ~Z such that (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′](Z 6= z∗). Let ~W ′ = V − ~Z ′. Notice that
~W ′ is a superset of ~W . Moreover, a priori, ~W ′ may contain some variables in ~X , although we
shall show that this is not the case. Let ~w′′ be a setting of the variables in ~W that agrees with
~w′ on the variables in ~W and for Z ∈ ~Z ∩ ~W ′, sets Z to z∗ (its original value). Note that if
there is a variable V ∈ ~X ∩ ~W ′, then the setting of V is the same in ~x′, ~x, and ~w′′. Thus, even
if ~X and ~W ′ have a nonempty intersection, the models M ~X←~x′, ~W←~w′ and M ~X←~x′, ~W ′←~w′′ are
well defined. Since Z = z∗ in the unique solution to the equations in M ~X←~x′, ~W←~w′ and the
equations in M ~X←~x, ~W←~w′, it follows that (a) the equations in M ~X←~x′, ~W ′←~w′′ and M ~X←~x′, ~W←~w′
have the same solutions and (b) the equations in M ~X←~x, ~W ′←~w′′ and M ~X←~x, ~W←~w′ have the same
solutions. Thus, (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ′ ← ~w′′](¬ϕ ∧ (Z 6= z∗)) for all Z ∈ ~Z ′ and
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′](ϕ ∧ (Z = z∗)) for all Z ∈ ~Z ′. That is, AC2′ (and hence AC2)
holds for the pair (~Z ′, ~W ′). It follows that ~W ′ ∩ ~X = ∅, for otherwise ~X = ~x is not a cause of
ϕ: it violates AC3. Thus, ~Z ′ ⊇ ~X , and ~X = ~x is a cause′ of ϕ, as desired.
Proposition A.1 shows that, without loss of generality, the variables in ~Z can be taken to
be “active” in the causal process, in that they change value when the variables in ~X do. This
means that each variable in ~Z must be a descendant of some variable in ~X in the causal graph.
The next result shows that, without loss of generality, we can also assume that the variables in
~Z are on a path from a variable in ~X to a variable that appears in ϕ. Recall that we defined an
active causal process to consist of a minimal set ~Z that satisfies AC2.
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Proposition A.2: All the variables in an active causal process corresponding to a cause ~X = ~x
for ϕ in (M,~u) must be on a path from some variable in ~X to a variable in ϕ in the causal
network corresponding to M .
Proof: Suppose that ~Z is an active causal process, (~Z, ~W ) is the partition satisfying AC2 using
the setting (~x′, ~w′). By Proposition A.1, all the variables in ~Z must be descendants of a variable
in ~X . Suppose that some variable Z ∈ ~Z is not on a path from a variable in ~X to a variable in
ϕ. That means there is no path from Z to a variable in ϕ. It follows that there is no path from
Z to a variable Z ′ ∈ ~Z that is on a path from a variable in ~X to a variable in ϕ. Thus, changing
the value of Z cannot affect the value of ϕ nor of any variable Z ′ ∈ ~Z. Let ~Z ′ = ~Z − {Z} and
~W ′ = ~W ∪ {Z}. Extend ~w′ to ~w′′ by assigning Z to its original value z∗ in context (M,~u). It
is now immediate from the preceding observations that (~Z ′, ~W ′) is a partition satisfying AC2
using the setting (~x′, ~w′′). This contradicts the minimality of ~Z.
A.2 A closer look at AC2(b)
Clause AC2(b) in the definition of causality is complicated by the need to check that ϕ remains
true if ~X is set to ~x, any subset of the variables in ~W is set to ~w′, and all the variables in an
arbitrary subset ~Z ′ of ~Z are set to their original values ~z∗ (that is, the values they had in the
original context, where ~X = ~x and ~W = ~w). This check would be simplified considerably if,
for each variable z ∈ ~Z and each subset ~W ′ of ~W , we have that Z = z∗ when ~X = ~x and
~W ′ = ~w′; that is, if we require in AC2(b) that (M,u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← w′](Z = z∗) for all
variables Z ∈ ~Z and all subsets ~W ′ of ~W . (Note that this requirement would imply the current
requirement.) This stronger requirement holds in all the examples we have considered so far.
However, the following example shows that it does not hold in general.
Example A.3: Imagine that a vote takes place. For simplicity, two people vote. The measure is
passed if at least one of them votes in favor. In fact, both of them vote in favor, and the measure
passes. This version of the story is almost identical to the disjunctive scenario in Example 3.2.
If we use V1 and V2 to denote how the voters vote (Vi = 0 if voter i votes against and Vi = 1
if she votes in favor) and P to denote whether the measure passes (P = 1 if it passes, P = 0
if it doesn’t), then in the context where V1 = V2 = 1, it is easy to see that each of V1 = 1 and
V2 = 1 is a cause of P = 1. However, suppose we now assume that there is a voting machine
that tabulates the votes. Let M represent the total number of votes recorded by the machine.
Clearly M = V1+V2 and P = 1 iffM ≥ 1. The following causal network represents this more
refined version of the story. In this more refined scenario, V1 = 1 and V2 = 1 are still both
causes of P = 1. Consider V1 = 1. Take ~Z = {V1,M, P} and ~W = V2. Much like the simpler
version of the story, if we choose the contingency V2 = 0, then P is counterfactually dependent
on V1, so AC2(a) holds. To check that this contingency satisfies AC2(b), note that setting V1
to 1 and V2 to 0 results in P = 1, even if we also set M to 2 (its current value). However,
if we had insisted in AC2(b) that (M,u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← w′](Z = z∗) for all variables
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Figure 12: An example showing the need for AC2(b).
Z ∈ ~Z (which in this case means that M would have to retain its original value of 2 when
V1 = 1 and V2 = 0), then neither V1 = 1 nor V2 = 1 would be a cause of P = 1 (although
V1 = 1 ∧ V2 = 1 would be a cause of P = 1). Since, in general, one can always imagine
that a change in one variable produces some feeble change in another, we cannot insist on the
variables in ~Z remaining constant; instead, we require merely that changes in ~Z not affect ϕ.
We remark that this example is not handled correctly by Pearl’s causal beam definition.
According to the causal beam definition, there is no cause for P = 1! It can be shown that
if X = x is an actual (or contributory) cause of Y = y according to the causal beam def-
inition given in [Pearl 2000], then it is an actual cause according to the definition here. As
Example A.3 shows, the converse is not necessarily true.
Another complicating factor in AC2(b) is that the requirement must hold for all subsets ~W ′
of ~W . In a preliminary version of this paper [Halpern and Pearl 2001], we required only that
AC2(b) hold for ~W . That is, the condition we had was
AC2(b′). (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z.
However, as Hopkins and Pearl [2002] pointed out, AC2(b′) is too permissive. To use their
example, suppose that a prisoner dies either if A loads B’s gun and B shoots, or if C loads and
shoots his gun. TakingD to represent the prisoner’s death and making the obvious assumptions
about the meaning of the variables, we have thatD = 1 iff (A = 1∧B = 1)∨(C = 1). Suppose
that in the actual context u, A loads B’s gun, B does not shoot, but C does load and shoot his
gun, so that the prisoner dies. Clearly C = 1 is a cause of D = 1. We would not want to say
that A = 1 is a cause of D = 1, given that B did not shoot (i.e., given that B = 0). However,
with AC2(b′), A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. For we can take ~W = {B,C} and consider the
contingency where B = 1 and C = 0. It is easy to check that AC2(a) and AC2(b′) hold for this
contingency, so under the old definition, A = 1 was a cause of D = 1. However, AC2(b) fails
in this case, for (M,u) |= [A← 1, C ← 0]D = 0.
A.3 Causality with infinitely many variables
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that V , the set of exogenous variables, is finite. Our
definition (in particular, the minimality clause AC3) has to be modified if we drop this assump-
tion. To see why, consider the following example:
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Example A.4: Suppose that V = {X0, X1, X2, . . . , Y }. Further assume that the structural
equations are such that Y = 1 iff infinitely many of the Xi’s are 1; otherwise Y = 0. Suppose
that in the actual context, all of the Xi’s are 1 and, of course, so is Y . What is the cause of
Y = 1?
According to our current definitions, it is actually not hard to check that there is no event
which is the cause of Y = 1. For suppose that ∧i∈IXi = 1 is a cause of Y = 1, for some subset
I of the natural numbers. If I is finite, then to satisfy AC2(a), we must take ~W to be a cofinite
subset of the Xi’s (that is, ~W must include all but finitely many of the Xi’s). But then if we set
all but finitely many of the Xi’s in ~W to 0 (as we must to satisfy AC2(a) if I is finite), AC2(b)
fails. On the other hand, if I is infinite and there exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) such that AC2(a)
and (b) hold, then if I ′ is the result of removing the smallest element from I , it is easy to see
that ∧i∈I′Xi = 1 also satisfies AC2(a) and (b), so AC3 fails.
Example A.4 shows that the definition of causality must be modified if V is infinite. It seems
that the minimality condition AC3 should be modified. Here is a suggested modification:
AC3′. If any strict subset ~X ′ of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2, then there is a strict
subset ~X ′′ of ~X ′ that also satisfies AC1 and AC2.
It is easy to see that AC3 and AC3′ agree if V is finite. Roughly speaking, AC3′ says that if
there is a minimal conjunction that satisfies AC1 and AC2, then it is a cause. If there is no
minimal one (because there is an infinite descending sequence), then any conjunction along
the sequence qualifies as a cause.
If we use AC3′ instead of AC3, then in Example A.4, ∧i∈IXi = 1 is a cause of Y = 1 as
long as I is infinite. Note that it is no longer the case that we can restrict to a single conjunct if
V is infinite.
We do not have sufficient experience with this definition to be confident that it is indeed
just what we want, but it seems like a reasonable choice.
A.4 Causality in nonrecursive models
We conclude by considering how the definition of causality can be modified to deal with non-
recursive models. In nonrecursive models, there may be more than one solution to an equation
in a given context, or there may be none. In particular, that means that a context no longer nec-
essarily determines the values of the endogenous variables. Earlier, we identified a primitive
event such as X = s with the basic causal formula [ ](X = x), that is, with the special case of
a formula of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ with k = 0. (M,~u) |= [ ](X = x) if X = x
in all solutions to the equations where ~U = ~u. It seems reasonable to identify [ ](X = x) with
X = x if there is a unique solution to these equations. But it is not so reasonable if there may
be several solutions, or no solution. What we really want to do is to be able to say that X = x
under a particular setting of the variables. Thus, we now take the truth of a primitive event such
as X = x relative not just to a context, but to a complete description (~u,~v) of the values of both
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the exogenous and the endogenous variables. That is, (M,~u,~v) |= X = x if X has value x in
~v. Since the truth of X = x depends on just ~v, not ~u, we sometimes write (M,~v) |= X = x.
We extend this definition to Boolean combinations of primitive events in the standard way. We
then define (M,~u,~v) |= [~Y ← ~y]ϕ if (M,~v′) |= ϕ for all solutions (~u,~v′) to the equations in
M~Y←~y. Since the truth of [~Y ← ~y](X = x) depends only on the context ~u and not on ~v, we
typically write (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x).
The formula 〈~Y ← ~y〉(X = x) is the dual of [~Y ← ~y](X = x); that is, it is an abbreviation
of ¬[~Y ← ~y](X 6= x). It is easy to check that (M,~u,~v) |= 〈~Y ← ~y〉(X = x) if in some
solution to the equations in M~Y←~y in context ~u, the variable X has value x. For recursive
models, it is immediate that [~Y ← ~y](X = x) is equivalent to 〈~Y ← ~y〉(X = x), since all
equations have exactly one solution.
With these definitions in hand, it is easy to state our definition of causality for arbitrary
models. Note it is now taken with respect to a tuple (M,~u,~v), since we need the values of the
exogenous variables to define the actual world.
Definition A.5: ~X = ~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M,~u,~v) if the following three conditions
hold.
AC1. (M,~v) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ.
AC2. There exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the
variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u,~v) |= ~Z = ~z∗, then
(a) (M,~u) |= 〈 ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′〉¬ϕ.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z. (Note that in part
(a) we require that the value of ϕ change only in some solution to the equations,
while in (b), we require that it stay true in all solutions.)
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
While this seems like the most natural generalization of the definition of causality to deal
with nonrecursive models, we have not examined examples to verify that this definition gives
the expected result, partly because all the standard examples are most naturally modeled using
recursive models.
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